{"id":"CVE-2026-35621","published":"2026-04-10T16:03:09Z","modified":"2026-06-23T16:15:47Z","title":"OpenClaw < 2026.3.24 - Privilege Escalation via chat.send to Allowlist Persistence","vendor":"OpenClaw","product":"OpenClaw","tier":"tail","description":{"text":"OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability where the /allowlist command fails to re-validate gateway client scopes for internal callers, allowing operator.write-scoped clients to mutate channel authorization policy. Attackers can exploit chat.send to build an internal command-authorized context and persist channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy changes reserved for operator.admin scope.","provenance":"source","from":"CVE.org"},"cvss":{"score":6.5,"severity":"MEDIUM","version":"3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","provenance":"source","from":"CVE.org CNA"},"epss":{"score":0.00275,"percentile":0.20308,"provenance":"source"},"cwes":[{"id":"CWE-862","name":"Missing Authorization"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9","tags":["vendor-advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-privilege-escalation-via-chat-send-to-allowlist-persistence","tags":["third-party-advisory"]}],"priority":{"score":8.6,"factors":[{"name":"EPSS percentile","points":4.06},{"name":"CVSS severity","points":4.55}]},"vendorSlug":"openclaw","affectedVersions":[{"vendor":"OpenClaw","product":"OpenClaw","versions":["< 2026.3.24"]}],"fixedVersions":[{"vendor":"OpenClaw","product":"OpenClaw","versions":["2026.3.24"]}],"ssvc":{"exploitation":"none","automatable":"no","technicalImpact":"partial","timestamp":"2026-04-10T18:21:07.292383Z","from":"CISA ADP","provenance":"source"},"affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","vulnerableRanges":["<2026.3.24"],"patched":["2026.3.24"],"from":["GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9"],"provenance":"source"}],"summary":{"text":"The /allowlist command in OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 fails to re-validate gateway client scopes for internal callers, so a client holding the operator.write scope can change channel authorization policy that should require operator.admin. An attacker with network access and a write-scoped gateway client, with no user interaction required, can use chat.send to build an internal command-authorized context and persist changes to the channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policies.","provenance":"ai","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","generatedAt":"2026-11-20T22:11:09Z"},"euvd":{"id":"EUVD-2026-21434","exploited":false,"provenance":"source"}}