Rockwell Automation ControlLogix PLC Information Exposure
Rockwell Automation · 1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, 1768-EWEB communication modules
The flaw is an information exposure in the 1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT and 1768-EWEB communication modules, which are part of Rockwell Automation's ControlLogix PLC line. An attacker who sends a specially crafted CIP packet to ports 2222 or 44818 (TCP or UDP) can obtain confidential information from the device, with no authentication or user interaction required and only network access needed.
Official description · CVE.org
An information exposure of confidential information results when the device receives a specially crafted CIP packet to Port 2222/TCP, Port 2222/UDP, Port 44818/TCP, or Port 44818/UDP. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could cause loss of confidentiality. Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP products; 1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, and 1768-EWEB communication modules; CompactLogix L32E and L35E controllers; 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix adapter; 1794-AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP adapter; ControlLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 18 and earlier; GuardLogix 18 and earlier; SoftLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix controllers 19 and earlier; SoftLogix controllers 19 and earlier; ControlLogix controllers 20 and earlier; GuardLogix controllers 20 and earlier; and MicroLogix 1100 and 1400
- Exploited
- Not confirmed
- Reports
- 0
- Tactics
- 0/15
Exploitation timelineDated milestones for a CVE: when it was disclosed, when exploit code became public, when exploitation was confirmed, and when threat reports named it.
Disclosed on 24 Jan 2013. No public exploit code or confirmed exploitation is recorded.
Affected versions and fixes
as published in the CVE recordRockwell Automation 1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, 1768-EWEB communication modules
Affected: All
Rockwell Automation CompactLogix L32E and L35E controllers
Affected: All
Rockwell Automation 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix adapter
Affected: All
Rockwell Automation 1794-AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP adapter
Affected: All
Rockwell Automation ControlLogix, CompactLogix, GuardLogix, and SoftLogix
Affected: <= 18
Rockwell Automation CompactLogix and SoftLogix controllers
Affected: <= 19
Rockwell Automation ControlLogix and GuardLogix controllers
Affected: <= 20
Rockwell Automation MicroLogix
Affected: 1100 · 1400
Fix
According to Rockwell, any of the above products that become affected by a vulnerability can be reset by rebooting or power cycling the affected product. After the reboot, the affected product may require some reconfiguration. To mitigate the vulnerabilities, Rockwell has developed and released security patches on July 18, 2012, to address each of the issues. To download and install the patches please refer to Rockwell’s Advisories at: https://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/470154 https://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/aid/470155 https://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/aid/470156 For more information on security with Rockwell Automation products, please refer to Rockwell’s Security Advisory Index http://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/54102 .
Workaround
Rockwell recommends updating to the newest firmware patches to fix the vulnerabilities, but if not able to do so right away, then Rockwell advises immediately employing the following mitigations for each of the affected products. To mitigate the vulnerabilities pertaining to receiving valid CIP packets: * Block all traffic to the Ethernet/IP or other CIP protocol-based devices from outside the Manufacturing Zone by restricting or blocking access to TCP and UDP Ports 2222 and 44818 using appropriate security technology such as a firewall or Unified Threat Management (UTM). * Employ a UTM appliance that specifically supports CIP message filtering. In addition to the above, Rockwell recommends concerned customers remain vigilant and continue to follow security strategies that help reduce risk and enhance overall control system security. Where possible, they suggest you apply multiple recommendations and complement this list with your own best-practices: * Employ layered security and defense-in-depth methods in system design to restrict and control access to individual products and control networks. Refer to http://www.ab.com/networks/architectures.html for comprehensive information…
What security researchers reported
Not named in any threat report yetAlso mentioned in 3 community threat pulses (AlienVault OTX)
Weaker evidencePulses are indicator collections that anyone can publish. A mention is not confirmation of exploitation.
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